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26 September 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 35/80)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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FACTORS BEHIND SAUDI-IRAQI RAPPROCHEMENT STUDIED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Aug 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "The Saudi-Iraqi Conference: Bilateral Rapprochement and an Analysis of the Problems of the Hot Arab Summer"]

[Text] The Iraqi-Saudi summit conference which was held in al-Ta'if has special significance. On the one hand, it draws attention to the close relations between the two countries; on the other hand, it comes at a time of tense political activity in the Arab world and rapid international developments with regard to the Middle East situation. The following report from Riyadh was received by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI a few hours before press time.

When the plane of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein shortly before noon last Tuesday landed in al-Ta'if airport--a summer resort town in the western part of Saudi Arabia--he was met by King Khalid, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Fahd, and 2nd Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard Prince 'Abdallah. While the sudden visit is not unusual in view of the close ties between the two countries, it was the first visit by the Iraqi president since he took office.

Observers, no doubt, paid great attention to the visit, not only as a symbol of the close ties that now exist between the two countries, but as underscoring the critical political situation in the Arab world.

Two recent Middle East developments were at the top of the bilateral conference: 1) Israel's decision to make Jerusalem its capital, followed by Begin's decision to move his office to Arab East Jerusalem, and 2) the recent United Nations resolution acknowledging the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the creation of a sovereign state. The discussions also explored measures the Arabs must take to secure the isolation of the Zionist state, which continues to defy the international will arrogantly and boastfully.

Much of the discussion, no doubt, centered on the extremely sensitive situation in the Arab world, made all the more urgent by deterioration

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in bilateral Arab relations, the collapse of security in Lebanon, and the political chaos in Syria. Another agenda item of equal urgency was the political situation in the Gulf region. Due to its geographic proximity to both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and owing to their leadership positions in the Arab world, the two countries have historically felt responsible for the security of the region. International developments and potential superpower rivalry over the region, coupled with the state of anarchy prevailing in Iran, are putting this responsibility to the test.

The Iraqi president's visit underscores the extent of improvement in Saudi-Iraqi friendship and cooperation. It is safe to say that the two countries now have a standing policy for consultation and coordination in all matters relating to national and regional issues. It is equally safe to say that at no time in history have relations between the two countries been better. This development bodes well for the future of the Gulf Region and the Arab world, particularly if viewed in terms of the two countries' ability to influence developments, and in the absence of a policy of comprehensive coordination in the Arab world.

Iraq makes no secret of its interest in developing its relations with Saudi Arabia. President Saddam Hussein on more than one occasion has emphasized that Iraq welcomes better relations with the Gulf states, notwithstanding the differences in their form of government, economic and social policies. He insists that Iraq's historic, ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with the Gulf states take precedence over any political or ideological differences.

Iraq indeed is interested in better relations with the Gulf states despite criticism from certain Arab quarters that in so doing it is putting ethnic ties before political ideology. Iraq responds that its policy is consistent with its national revolution commitments, which, in turn, are based on the principles of its political party [al-Ba'ath]. These principles, according to Iraq, are first and foremost Arab principles.

The Saudis are no less satisfied with their Iraqi ties. They are not unaware of the value of cooperation with their Arab neighbor state, which is emerging as the most powerful country militarily and politically in the upper Gulf region and along the eastern flank of the Arab world. The Saudis credit Iraq's flexibility in dealing with a variety of Arab governments with having dispelled Saudi reservations about Iraq's prior [political] roles, first as a Hashemite monarchy, and later under ['Abd al-Karim] Qasim, whose actions in the Gulf region were haphazard and unpredictable.

The truth is that over and above their geographic, ethnic, historical and religious affinity, the developing Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement is based primarily on political considerations. These include:

--Egypt's decision to break away from the Arab front and to seek accommodation with the United States and Israel. Saudi Arabia's loss of her natural ally of the 1970's prompted her to seek a new Arab ally, preferably of equivalent

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clout, to help her balance her Gulf and Arab policy, and to counter the increasing American pressure to support the Camp David accords and bring her in line with the American Gulf strategy.

--The failure of the Iranian revolution to establish a stable government and its attempt to export revolution to the other side of the Gulf by fanning religious and sectarian fanaticism. The Iranian attempt was made in total disregard of the strength of Arab nationalism as a mainstay of all Arab governments, regardless of political orientation. This disregard led to open conflict with Iraq and to latent opposition from other Gulf states, which feel ill at ease with Iran's revolutionary aspirations, and which look to Iraq for their security and as a bulwark against Iranian inspired anarchy.

--The increasing international tension in the area as a result of the conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as in the Indian Ocean, the approaches to the Red Sea and the Gulf, and in Africa. These conflicts have convinced the Arabs of the need for regional cooperation in defense of their national interests.

--The prominent position of the two countries as oil producers. After the United States and the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer. Its daily production of 9.5 million barrels is shared by a large number of consuming nations. Iraq comes second with a daily production of 3.5 million barrels exported to an equally large number of nations. By virtue of their position as oil producers, the two neighbors find it necessary to consult and to coordinate their oil policies, despite the fact that their methods of production and marketing are almost completely different.

Another twofold problem in all likelihood occupied a good share of the attention at the Saudi-Iraqi conference: the deteriorating political and security situation in Lebanon, and the current developments in Syria, whose ramifications are bound to affect inter-Arab relations and, quite likely, Syrian-Iraqi relations themselves. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are anxious about the diminishing influence of the legal government in Lebanon, the lack of security, the recent Phalangist activity, and the worsening of relations among the various Lebanese factions to the point where debates are conducted with guns and enemy liquidation has become a common practice.

Iraq's Lebanese policy centers on encouraging debate among the warring factions, supporting the legal government, and rejection of any faction with ties to Israel. Iraq is convinced that many of the social and ideological problems besetting Lebanon can be overlooked for the sake of restoring national unity or, at least, political agreement.

Since the outbreak of the 1975 war, Saudi Arabia has played an active role in Lebanese affairs. Lately, however, due to a variety of competing Arab and Lebanese related issues, Saudi [diplomatic] activity has been somewhat reduced.

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It is not unreasonable to assume that the Saudi-Iraqi conference will define the outlines of a new policy for cooling the Lebanese situation and for countering potential Israeli designs on that country.

The Syrian problem as perceived by both Iraq and Saudi Arabia is no less critical and fraught with danger than its Lebanese counterpart. Observers are undoubtedly aware that internal tensions are bound to affect Syria's Arab relations, as well as weaken her military and political role in Lebanon.

It is also no secret that the recent dangerous developments on the international and Lebanese scenes have cast a dark shadow on Iraqi-Syrian relations, which were lukewarm to begin with. It is no secret either that the Saudi diplomatic circles, noted for secretiveness, are anxious about the current situation in Syria and Syrian-Iraqi relations.

As mentioned earlier, Prince Fahd was understood to be preparing for a new tour of a number of Arab capitals in the near future. Although the trip has not been confirmed officially, it is believed that its purpose is to clear the atmosphere of Arab relations.

Two days before the opening of the Saudi-Iraqi conference, a Syrian government newspaper charged indirectly that Jordan, Iraq and Turkey are blockading Syria. One week before the summit conference, Colonel Rif'at al-Asad, the younger brother of President Hafiz al-Asad, paid a visit to Saudi Arabia and met with King Khalid. Their discussions reportedly were extremely frank and dealt in detail with a variety of Arab affairs and relations.

At any rate, in view of the extremely sensitive circumstances and the need for complete secrecy that surround discussions of this type, it is difficult to guess the precise nature of the Saudi-Iraqi or the Saudi-Syrian discussions. It may be necessary to wait a few weeks and to watch Arab moves for results or signals.

The Iraqi President's visit to Saudi Arabia took place in Ramadan, just before the feast of al-Fitr. It behooves every patriotic Arab and Moslem to pray that the results of the conference will turn out for the good of the Arabs.

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MIDEAST TRADE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN EXAMINED

Examination of Relations

Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Aug 80 pp 45-51

[Article by Hokaji Mino, editor in chief of BUSINESS JAPAN]

[Text]

THE Middle East supplies approximately 80% of Japan's petroleum requirements. Not only does it figure prominently as an export market but it is also an extremely important region for the world economy as a whole. Events occurring there have immediate global effects and repercussions.

It is only recently that relations between Japan and the Middle East have become active, but they are expected to expand rapidly hereafter. The present situation is described below, country-by-country, in extremely general terms.

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia is an extremely important energy supplier for Japan, accounting for 30% (the largest percentage) of its petroleum and 50% of its LPG imports. Prior to the first oil crisis, petroleum transactions were conducted principally through the majors, and Japan had few direct dealings or economic cooperative relations with Saudi Arabia. Following the outbreak of the oil crisis, however, economic relations between the two countries rapidly grew stronger over a period of a few years as a result of the visits to Saudi Arabia of then International Trade and Industry Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and special envoy Taken Miki (Dec. 1973) and the subsequent conclusion of a Japan-Saudi Arabia economic and technological

cooperation agreement (signed March 1975, implemented May 18). This was followed by MITI Minister Toshio Komoto's visit and the subsequent convening of the first Japan-Saudi Arabia joint committee meeting (Jan. 1976), on the basis of which the joint committee office in Riyadh was established.

Also, in the private sector, a Japan-Saudi Arabia cooperation organization was set up in August 1973, and, later in October, a higher level Middle East Cooperation Center covering the whole of the Middle East was established.

The economic and technological cooperation agreement between the two countries consists of five articles: Promotion of economic and technological cooperation (Article 1), establishment of joint ventures and the contents of technological cooperation (Article 2), supply of required services and facilities (Article 3), encouragement of economic and technological cooperation between the peoples of the two nations (Article 4) and encouragement of Japanese capital investments (Article 5).

The Saudi Arabian government attaches particular importance to joint ventures and technological transfers and regards plant exports on the basis of tenders as business transactions. This attitude differs greatly from that

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of Iraq, which regards large-scale plant construction as a type of economic cooperation, an attitude which is due probably to the smaller structure of the latter's economy.

Japan-Saudi Arabia joint ventures already number 25, the most notable of which are in the fields of methanol and petrochemical production. In the case of methanol, Mitsubishi Gas-Chemical Co., Inc. and C. Itoh have together invested 50% and the Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 50% in a joint company which will build a plant in Al Jubayl in eastern Saudi Arabia, with completion targeted for 1982. A contract for the purpose was signed on November 24, 1979.

Under the plan, 600,000 tons annually of methanol obtained from petroleum-gas for chemical use will be produced, to be utilized for the manufacture of formalin for urea resin and for synthetic textile material. The Japanese government will invest part of the capital from the Economic Cooperation Fund. For its part, the Saudi Arabian government will reportedly allocate crude to Japan as incentive, but no details have yet been decided. Japan has a methanol production capacity of 1.4 million tons, so when this project is completed, adjustments will probably have to be made.

This petrochemical project is what might be called a monumental project between the two countries, and its economic aspects are of utmost importance. Along with the rise in the price of oil, the advantage of using gas, reportedly obtainable without extra cost at the site of the well, has grown as compared to the present method of producing naphtha obtained from crude oil.

The Saudi Petrochemical Development Co. (authorized capital: ¥1,000 million; 54 companies of the Mitsubishi group) was established in January 1979 for the purpose of conducting a joint survey. A year and a half was required for the study undertaken in cooperation with SABIC, the Saudi Arabian company, after which a joint company (a 50 - 50 investment by Japan and Saudi Arabia) was established. Construction will get under

way with the project targeted for completion in 1984 or 1985. Under the plan, 450,000 tons of ethylene and 200,000 tons of high-pressure polyethylene will be produced at the plant, also to be located in Al Jubayl, where the methanol plant is to be built. The Japanese government will treat the project as a national project, utilizing capital from the Economic Cooperation Fund.

In addition, the two countries will carry out joint research in seawater distillation. A basic contract was signed in September 1979, and details are now being studied. Technological cooperation will also be provided with over 150 experts to be dispatched to Saudi Arabia and more than 100 people to be trained in Japan.

The Saudi Arabian government is also greatly interested in research on the utilization of solar energy as a post-oil measure. It is reported that it has already signed a contract with an American firm for the construction of a large-scale solar-energy-utilizing community. Since Japan is also engaged in research and development in this field under its "Sunshine Project," it should also undertake joint research with Saudi Arabia which has great potential for utilizing solar energy. In addition, as a private sector project, the development of desert farming is being undertaken.

Iraq: Japan's relations with Iraq were greatly strengthened following the visits of special envoy Takeo Miki in December 1973 and MITI Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in January 1974, and they took concrete shape as a result of the signing of an economic and technological cooperation agreement in August 1974 (implemented on November 11). Under the agreement, Japan cooperated in the construction of six projects by providing US\$1,000 million (calculated on the basis of the exchange rate at the time) in funds, while Iraq promised to supply 90 million tons of petroleum products and LPG to Japan over a period of 10 years. It was indeed a landmark development that joined the stable supply of energy with economic cooperation.

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Thereafter, on the occasion of MITI Minister Toshio Komoto's visit to Iraq in January 1976, Iraq requested an additional loan of US\$1,000 million, and this was agreed to at the first Japan-Iraq joint committee (in Tokyo) in January 1977.

At the second joint committee meeting held at the time of MITI Minister Masumi Esaki's visit to Iraq in July 1979, concrete discussions were held on project replacement and on promotion of technological cooperation.

According to the agreement, Japan was to purchase 10 million tons of crude annually, but an easing off in global supply and demand and a recession in Japan came together, and as a result Japan purchased only half the agreed volume — five million tons. But because of the recent stringent supply and demand situation, Japan has now asked Iraq to increase the volume, which it promised to raise by 40%. It is a good example of a contract, despite having been signed, not proving useful because purchases are based on the profitability of private businesses.

A similar situation was seen in the case of Mexico. In November 1978, on the occasion of the visit to Japan of President Jose Lopez Portillo, Mexico offered to supply oil to Japan, but Japanese companies refused to accept delivery because of a slight price differential. When supply and demand became tight in 1979, however, they competed wildly for contracts. It will be necessary hereafter to reorganize the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation and establish a system that will insure stable purchases from abroad. Without it, there is the risk that economic cooperation, achieved after much effort, will become meaningless.

As for project cooperation, Iraq, because of its internal circumstances, sometimes requests changes in the contract — from a full turnkey to a separate formula. It would appear that there is the need to leave the road open for greater flexibility in the application of agreements.

At the second joint committee conference, it became obvious that Iraq's requests were moving into more advanced fields, from simple production technology to higher levels of production and control technologies as well as policy decision knowhow. It is believed to be due to the fact that Iraq's industrial technology is quite advanced. Already, over 470 trainees have come to Japan, while more than 70 experts have been dispatched to Iraq. An electrical industry training center has also been built.

Iran: Among the Middle Eastern countries, Iran's relations with Japan are the oldest. And since industrialization was carried out relatively earlier than in other Mideast nations, an agreement on economic and technological cooperation had already been signed in December 1958. Also 99 joint ventures had been approved up to 1978. Japan has accepted as many as 1,300 Iranian trainees and dispatched up to 400 experts to Iran. It is the most industrially advanced nation in the Middle East, and if its wealth of resources are effectively utilized, it has extremely great potential for development.

It will be interesting to see what effects the revolution, beginning with the exile of the Shah in January 1979, will have on the foregoing economic development.

A monumental project being carried out by Japan and Iran is the construction of a petrochemical complex. It was begun by five Mitsui companies during the reign of the Shah, and, when completed, will produce 300,000 tons of ethylene and 1,800,000 tons of LPG annually.

In July 1971 the Japanese government had decided to provide assistance in the form of a yen loan (documents exchanged in March 1976), but taking into consideration the suspension of construction due to the recent revolution and the possible cancellation of government assistance by the revolutionary regime, the Japanese government on October 12, 1979 decided to treat the project as a national project

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which would include investment of money from the Economic Cooperation Fund.

Since then, because of various circumstances including confusion in matters related to personnel within the Iranian government, the resumption of construction has been delayed, but completion at an early date is anticipated. As in the case of other projects, there has been a big rise in costs, which in January 1976 rose to ¥550,000 million as a result of the inflation following the oil crisis. Now the estimate is as high as ¥730,000 million. Taking into account the rise in oil prices, however, the project is expected to pay off over the long run.

In addition, the construction of a refinery for export purposes requested during the reign of the Shah has been suspended because of the revolution, but the revolutionary government has renewed that request for cooperation. It would be a Japan-Iran joint venture

involving the construction of a 500,000 bbls.-per-day capacity refinery at Bushehr, the products of which would be exported to Japan. It was requested by the Shah during then-MITI Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to Iran in January 1974.

Against the background of the then-stringent supply, the oil companies jumped at the prospect, but their interest waned thereafter as the situation eased. On the occasion of MITI Minister Toshio Komoto's visit to Iran in January 1976, it was decided to take up this project as a means of promoting friendly relations between Japan and Iran. A committee was established within the Middle East Cooperation Center to consolidate the setup on the Japanese side, a high-level group of experts representing the two countries was set up, and a joint survey was undertaken with the cooperation of the International Cooperation Agency. □

Promoting Cooperation

Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Aug 80 pp 53, 55

/Article by Michiyoshi Kawada, executive director, Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East/

/Text/

THE Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East (JCCME) has been engaged in a variety of projects involving Japan's international cooperation programs in relation to cementing economic and trade ties with Mideast countries. It was organized seven years ago, right after the fourth Middle East war when oil-producing countries in the region restricted their oil shipments overseas.

These restrictions awakened the world to the fact that there is a limit to oil deposits and that mankind must use the limited amount of this important energy source as economically as possible. Seven years have passed since then. Oil producing countries and importer nations have been groping for the best possible way to reach agreement, while each side strongly insists on its own views concerning oil resources.

Japan depends on Mideast oil for 75% of its oil needs. No one can deny the importance of this fact to Japan. Meantime, Mideast oil-producing countries are very much in need of helping hands from overseas in the course of their social and economic development projects which they are presently undertaking. No doubt the high level of technology Japanese industries can offer has interested them greatly as a way of proceeding with their national projects most effectively.

This can be a relationship of mutual dependence between Japan and the Mideast, and Japan should make every possible effort to meet the area's requirements for technologies necessary to facilitate development projects.

Outlined below are some of the important activities JCCME has completed so far.

Promoting Dialogues With the Mideast

1. Arab-Japan Cooperation Seminar and its related meetings: At the suggestion of the OAPEC Secretariat, the Arab-Japan Cooperation Seminar was held in Tokyo in November 1976. The occasion, the third of its kind after the first seminar in London in May 1974 and the second in Paris in November 1975, was designed to help smooth communications between Arab oil-producing countries and advanced industrialized nations.

With full support of MITI and the Foreign Office, JCCME acted as co-organizer with the Federation of Japanese Economic Organizations (Keidanren) for the Tokyo seminar. During the seminar, three themes - Energy, Infrastructure and Transfer of Industrial Technologies - were agreed upon by the participants for further in-depth study, on which the JCCME has organized a series of international meetings.

On the theme of Energy, views are exchanged every year between oil-producer nations and importer countries at a meeting sponsored by JCCME to which either Japan or the Arab side dispatches lecturers to make key speeches.

The subject of infrastructure has also been studied at three meetings so far. In June 1977, the Arab-Japan Port Facility Conference was held under the joint auspices of AFESD representing the Mideast side, and Japan's International Marine Development Center and JCCME. This was followed by the Arab-Japan Electric Telecommunications Conference in February 1979. The sponsors of this meeting were the IDCAS, ATU and ARABSAT from the Mideast, and Japan's Overseas Telecommunications and Broadcasting Consulting Cooperation, Federation of Electric Telecommunications Industries and JCCME. Another conference discussing development of the Mideast infrastructure was the Arab-Japan Electric Power and Energy Conference. It was held in February 1980 by OAPEC, AFESD and IDCAS representing Mideast nations, plus the Japan Plant Association, Federation of Electric Enterprises, Electric Power Sources Development Company and JCCME.

In the field of technological transfer, IDCAS and JCCME co-sponsored the Arab-Japan Conference of Technological Transfer in April 1978.

Instrumental in realizing all these conferences were Dr. A.A. Attiga, OAPEC's Secretary General, Dr. M. Imady, Secretary of AEESA, A. Azabi, secretary of IDCAS, and many key figures in Middle East countries who extended friendly assistance to facilitate communication between Japanese and Arabian sponsors.

2. Technical Seminars and Survey Teams: Prior to the series of international meetings outlined above, JCCME held the Mideast-Japan Sea Water Desalinization Cooperation Conference in coalition with MITI's Industrial Science and Technology Agency and the Water Desalinization Promotion Center. An outgrowth of the conference has been Japan's cooperation programs with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Mideast, creating opportunities for Japanese industries to participate in desalinization plant construction projects in many of the Middle East nations.

While communications have been facilitated through meetings and seminars on varied subjects, groups of leading figures from Arab countries have visited Japan on many occasions. Each time they had opportunities to make on-the-spot observations of Japan's highly sophisticated technological achievements, to become acquainted with Japanese culture and way of life, and to make personal contacts with the people.

Prominent figures in Japan's governmental and business circles have made many visits to the Mideast over the last six or seven years to further increase cooperation. At JCCME, several survey teams have been sent to collect data from many regions in the Mideast. They were the Port Facility Survey Group dispatched in 1977, the Infrastructure Study Team and the Electric Power Group in 1978, and the Electric Telecommunication Survey Team in 1980.

According to recent survey reports, many areas of the Mideast have expressed their desire for a greater number of Japanese specialists on various industrial technologies. Japan's program of

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training technicians and extending greater assistance to local technical training centers have also been highly evaluated. It can be said that giving technical guidance must come before expanding trade transactions. It is also apparent that these countries are fully aware that nothing is more important to a developing country than educating human resources.

A Bridge Between the Government and Private Sectors

JCCME, whose members are all private firms, is a semi-governmental organization since it is partly subsidized by the government. All its activities have been carried out through the closest possible coordination with MITI.

Although it is an advocate of a free economy, the Japanese government requires services of a coordinator between official and private interests when it comes to significant private projects which must be carried out from a long-range or a national point of view. When projects of such specified nature in the Mideast are worked out by the private sector, JCCME, which represents the interests of both parties, is called in to act as coordinator.

In such instances, JCCME organizes a special committee to deal with the matter. The first of these committees was the Saudi Arabia Cooperation Organization formed at the time of JCCME's inauguration. In 1974 the Iraq Committee was organized, followed by the Iran Committee in 1976 and the UAE Committee in 1977. It was necessary to have these specialized committees established in order to organize a consortium of Japanese firms, which otherwise might not have been prepared to undertake the large scale overseas projects.

Concerning the petrochemical plant construction program in Saudi Arabia, the JCCME committee acted as organizer of Japanese contractors, while it served as liaison body for the supply of major items for a large-scale indus-

trialization plan in Iraq immediately following signing of the Iraqi-Japanese Economic Cooperation Pact. When Japan's private participation in the Iranian petrochemical project was upgraded to a national project, the JCCME committee was given the task of coordinating private interests.

Another important activity of JCCME is to hold an annual forum for government officials and businessmen to discuss how best to promote Japan's economic cooperation with the Mideast in practical terms. Invited to the meeting, held every year since 1976, are Japanese representatives of manufacturers, trading companies and financial institutions doing business in many parts of the Mideast, together with leading figures in business and financial circles. Japanese government officials including those from MITI and other agencies also participate.

Usually the first two days are devoted to exchanges of information and discussions among the participants. On the third day, a joint meeting of governmental and private circles is held under the sponsorship of the Foreign Office. From 1976 to 1978, Istanbul, Turkey, was chosen as the site of the meeting, while the 1979 and 1980 meetings were convened in Vienna, Austria. It is expected that each of the participants will make the most of the results of the meeting in carrying out policies. Demonstrating its value, the meeting has seen an ever greater number of participants year after year.

No doubt the scope of JCCME activities will become more diversified in the future as projects become of greater significance and more challenging. Yet it is felt that the basis of Japan's cooperation programs with these countries lies mainly in expanding the range of mutual communications in economic, cultural, educational and many other fields, by which mutual understanding is promoted. The staff at the JCCME Secretariat has been dedicating its efforts to help deepen the mutual understanding between Japan and Mideast countries. □

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Contacts With Iraq

Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Aug 80 pp 57-64

[Article by Keiichi Matsumoto, Middle East Office, International Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry/

[Text]

THE relations between Japan and Iraq in the field of oil supply, trade and economic and technological cooperation have become increasingly closer in recent years. Iraq, led by President Saddam Hussein, is now making successful efforts to modernize the nation through strengthening the economy and improving welfare. Iraq now can expect more and more from Japan, which has contributed to Iraq's modernization, as the economic relations between the two countries have become closer. The present state of Japan-Iraq economic relations will be surveyed below.

Japan's trade with Iraq, like Japan's trade with other countries in the Middle East, has expanded rapidly since the quadrupling of oil prices toward the end of 1973. In 1979, Japan's exports to Iraq increased by 69.1% over the previous year, whereas its imports from Iraq increased 2.3 times from the previous year.

Japan's exports to Iraq increased steadily throughout the 1970s. The pace of increase quickened from 1974 onwards and, in particular, from 1977 onwards. The big increase in Japan's exports in 1979 from the previous year was due to the active demand for materials for import-substitute industrial projects, as based on the fourth five-year plan (1976-1980, total investment of \$49,000 million), relative to the hydrocarbon industry, agricultural development and housing construction. The 69.1% increase in Japan's exports in 1979 is remarkable when compared with the overall decrease of 2.2% in Japan's exports to the Middle Eastern countries.

A particularly large growth was recorded by heavy and chemical industry products (67.3% increase over the previous year) such as steel (100% increase) and transport machinery (138.8% increase) and also by textile goods (84.0% increase) and other light industry products such as tires and tubes (80.9% increase).

Japan's exports to Iraq stood second only to those to Saudi Arabia among the Middle Eastern countries in 1979.

Japan's imports from Iraq have increased rapidly from 1974 onwards, as in the case of Japan's exports to that country. The imports in 1979 totaled \$1,815,670,000, increasing by more than two times from \$776,870,000 in 1978.

Most of Japan's imports from Iraq (99.7% in 1979) are oil and other mineral fuels. Food items such as dates and processed goods account for the remaining tiny portion of the total. This means that the total value of Japan's imports from Iraq goes largely to its oil imports. In 1979, the import of mineral fuels in terms of value increased 2.4 times from the previous year. This was due to the fact that the volume of crude oil imports increased by about 60% from 1978 and, in addition, the Iranian revolution led to reduced oil production and, hence, a sudden hike in oil prices.

Table 1 shows how greatly Japan's oil imports from Iraq in terms of quantity have increased in recent years. Iraq's oil accounts for an increasing portion of Japan's total oil imports.

Table 1. Japan's crude oil imports from Iraq

Fiscal year	Import volume (1,000 kiloliters)	Import share (%)	Compared to the previous year (100%)
1973	978	0.3	—
74	2,611	0.9	167
75	6,060	2.3	132
76	8,344	3.0	37.7
77	8,696	3.1	4.2
78	10,481	3.9	20.5
79	16,953	6.1	61.7

Source: Energy statistics

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Japan's Economic Cooperation with Iraq

For Japan, Iraq is an important oil producer. Since the fourth Middle East War in 1973, Japan's economic cooperation with Iraq has progressed rapidly. In August 1974, an economic and technical cooperation agreement was concluded between Japan and Iraq to bring about closer relations in economic and technical cooperation between the two nations. The gist of the agreement was that in compensation for Japan's economic and technical cooperation in Iraq's economic development projects in the form of mixed loans (initially \$1,000 million of yen credits and private credits), Iraq will ensure Japan a supply of 90 million tons of crude oil (in 10 years) and 1,200,000 tons per year of LPG (for 15 years).

In September 1975, a mixed loan of ¥87,400 million (¥21,800 million of yen credits and ¥65,500 million of export credits) was granted for a fertilizer plant project at Khor Al Zubayr. This was the first project launched under the economic and technological cooperation agreement. In January 1977, a mixed loan of ¥58,100 million (¥14,500 million in yen credits and ¥43,600 million in export credits) was granted for a thermal power plant project.

These are the two projects that have been undertaken so far under the Japan-Iraq agreement. An additional loan of ¥294,000 million (all export credits) was made in response to the rising project cost at the first Japan-Iraq joint committee held in January 1977.

Table 2. Japan's trade with Iraq

(Exports)				
Item \ Year	1977	1978	1979	Compared to the previous year (100%)
Total exports	872,159	951,450	1,608,823	169.1%
Foodstuffs	925	2,137	2,111	98.8
Light in industrial products	140,555	99,214	183,451	184.9
Textile products	83,926	35,635	65,578	184.0
Non-ferrous metal products	21,379	14,456	20,685	143.1
Other light industrial products	35,250	49,123	97,188	197.8
Heavy chemical industrial products	726,223	843,322	1,410,909	167.3
Chemical products	19,629	22,223	34,303	154.4
Metal products	190,900	198,596	483,147	243.3
Machinery and tools	515,694	622,503	893,459	143.5
General machinery	322,929	299,879	355,493	118.5
Electric machinery	96,389	188,237	218,904	116.3
Transport machinery	85,993	124,805	298,080	238.8
Precision machinery	10,383	9,581	20,982	219.0
Re-exports and special items	2,753	3,945	6,415	162.6

(Imports)				
Item \ Year	1977	1978	1979	Compared to the previous year (100%)
Total imports	735,211	776,874	1,815,670	233.7%
Mineral fuels	731,808	767,686	1,810,330	235.8
Crude oil	731,540	758,113	1,775,383	234.2
Oil products	0	9,572	34,947	365.1
Liquefied petroleum gas	-	-	-	-
Re-imports and special items	688	8,901	4,998	56.2

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Of the total loan of ¥592,000 million, about 25% went into the two projects; no decision has yet been made on the remaining 75%. In August 1978, a note was exchanged to extend the term for concluding contracts from four years to nine years.

Technical Cooperation

One of the major technical cooperation projects on a government basis concerns the establishment in Baghdad of a training center for electrical technology. This center is to provide training relating to elevators, refrigeration, air conditioning and general electronic equipment. In order to establish such a training center under the cooperation of the Iraq Ministry of Mining and

Manufacturing Industries and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Japan sends materials and machinery as well as specialists in related fields to Iraq.

Other technical cooperation projects have included preliminary studies for the development of rice farms in the Qatar district and an agricultural reconstruction program, both in 1978.

Up to the end of fiscal 1979, Japan had sent to Iraq a total of 61 specialists through JICA in such fields as heavy industries, agriculture, postal services and administration, and received from Iraq a total of 482 JICA trainees in postal services, transport and light industries and 216 other trainees in the chemical and automobile industries.

Table 3. Receiving trainers and dispatching specialists

	Organization	Fiscal 1979 (persons)	Total up to the end of 1979 (persons)	Field
Receiving trainees	JICA	76	482	Postal services, transport, light industries
	The Training Association	86	216	Construction Chemistry, automobile, food- stuffs
Dispatching specialists	JICA	10	61	Heavy industries, agriculture and forestry, postal services Administration

Exchange of Important Personnel

Japan and Iraq have strengthened relations in the area of cultural exchange as their economic relations have become closer.

The first Japan-Iraq joint committee meeting was held in Tokyo in January 1977 under the Japan-Iraq economic and technical cooperation agreement. This was attended by, on the Iraq side, Vice-President, Foreign Minister, Trade Minister and, on the Japanese side, International Trade and Industry Minister Tatsuo Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Director-General Kuranari of the Economic Planning Agency. The participants exchanged views on trade and economic relations in general between the two nations.

In July last year, the then International Trade and Industry Minister Masumi Esaki visited Iraq to attend the second Japan-Iraq joint committee meeting. This was attended, on the Iraqi side, by Planning Minister. Esaki also had talks with Vice-Chairman Haddam Hussein of the Revolution Command Council and other high-ranking officials of Iraq.

Prior to the conclusion of the Japan-Iraq economic and technical cooperation agreement, special envoy Takeo Miki and the then International Trade and Industry Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Iraq, in December 1973 and January 1974, respectively, to discuss the agreement issue.

In February this year, special envoy Sunao Sonoda visited Iraq to have

high-level talks with President Hussein, Trade Minister and Vice-President. In June-July, Councillor Naohiro Amaya of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry went to Iraq to exchange opinions with the Vice-President and Trade Minister Ali on the Japan-Iraq trade and economic relations. In August 1974, Iraq's Economic Minister Azawi came to Japan to sign the Japan-Iraq economic cooperation agreement.

Cultural Exchanges

Cultural exchanges between Japan and Iraq have expanded since the autumn of 1977. Instances include an excavation project in Iraq by a Japanese university team, judo and karate demonstrations, film shows and invitations to students and young leaders. In March 1978, an aviation agreement and a cultural agreement were con-

cluded between the two nations.

In Baghdad, the "Baghdad International Trade Fair" is held every year under the sponsorship of the Iraqi Trade Ministry. JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) and many Japanese corporations have participated in the fair since 1974.

Iraq is one of the exhibitors at the Arab Exhibition currently being held in Tokyo (July-September) under the sponsorship of JETRO.

As we have seen, the relations between Japan and Iraq have become closer than ever in recent years with regard to trade and economic and technical cooperation. Such cooperative relations will become even stronger in the future now that Iraq looks more and more to Japan for assistance in promoting its economic development. □

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IRAQI AID OFFERED TO MAURITANIA--It has been indicated that Iraq has offered Mauritania \$3 million earmarked for a color TV station. This money will also allow for a municipal lighting electric network to be set up for the crowded sections of Nouakchott. Iraq has given Mauritania a gift of \$1.5 million for the construction of an educational and technical training building. This aid was provided for in the agreements reached between the two countries during the visit which Taha Yacine Ramadane, first vice president of Iraq, made to Nouakchott. In addition, the Iraqi ambassador in Nouakchott has given Mauritanian authorities printing press material valued at 50,000 FF, a gift of the publishing house Dar El Jamahir, Iraq. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2025] 9572

MAURITANIA, LIBYA RURAL DEVELOPMENT--Mauritania and Libya have decided to create a rural development company. According to the Mauritanian daily paper CHAAB, the new company will have a temporary budget of 350 million ouguiya (35 million FF) and will be directed by Dr Liman Abderrahmane El Hadji, general secretary of the Mauritanian ministry of rural development. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2025] 9572

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AFGHANISTAN

TWO DOCTORS REPORT ON AFGHAN GUERRILLAS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2 Aug 80 pp 46-47

[Interview with Dr Jacques Faien, a member of MDM (Doctors of the World) organization, on 2 August 1980 by J.-F.H.--place not given]

[Text] A 38 year old surgeon, Dr Jacques Faien and 28 year old Jean-Elie Malkin, a resident medicat student in Paris, just travelled--by foot--close to 600 km in 20 days in the heart of insurgent Afghanistan. The two MDM (Doctors of the World) envoys were on an exploratory mission for their organization, just like their colleagues, Eric Cheysson and Patrick Laburthe who, today, are always found with guerrilla free-fighters in other regions of the country. MDM* is presided by Dr Bernard Kouchner, who intends to install a permanent clinic in Afghanistan.

In the course of their dangerous and exhausting trip, the two doctors were able to observe first hand, from one valley to the next, how the indomitable Afghan people live and fight. Without any doubt, [Afghanistan] is an islamic feudal state, but one which nothing and no one will be able to modernize. The Red Army tried to do just that, by hook or by crook.

Monday, 21 July, you were able to watch, on Channel 2, Philippe Rochot and Jacques Douay's film on the subject. Dr Faien, a Beyrouth, Eritrean and "Bateau pour le Vietnam" veteran, who has reacted towards the war, through medicine, counterpoints the film's images, which already says a lot.

* C.c.p. no. 11.669.07. H Paris

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[Question] How do you describe the guerrilla?

[Answer] We have seen a gigantic rebellion, encompassing an entire country. Moudjaheddins fight for 1 or 2 weeks under the direction of local authorities; then they go back to their crops; then they return and so on. Close to the zones held by the Soviets, as Gazhni, on the Kandahar-Kaboul road, where we passed, civilians remain hidden in the mountains and at night, freedom fighters do what they want. Other than that the Russians don't control anything. When a village is bombarded, the people disappear, taking refuge--temporary or not--in caves. The guerrilla is completely mobile. The Soviets send armored patrols outside their holds, but they cannot venture into the mountains, because they can get cut off. Foot soldiers are sent from afar.

[Question] How can the moudjaheddins, lightly armed, attack tanks?

[Answer] Pashtouns escorts explained [this to us] on a road where skeletons of armored vehicles, destroyed before and after Russian intervention were piled up: Men dig trenches under the road, leaving nothing but the thin tar surface, then they attack with antitank grenades or Molotov cocktails. Arms arrive by camel caravan. For example, we saw Soviet machine-guns and bazookas, which Egypt sent via Pakistan. But the route is long and hazardous.

[Question] How do they establish troop coordination?

[Answer] They don't. Militarily, nobody can win. The islamic rising is unseizable. It's organized in flexible units (merkhaz), or combat centers, which are permanent dispositions or groups of mountain people, mobilized for a given time. Soviet colonels then, simply don't have any objectives. No battlefields to take, no targets to hit. The freedom fighters go deep into the country, as [if] in a comforter, in the midst of huge mountains made to order for guerrilla [warfare]. Afghans are the best guerrilla fighters in the world. As long as the Soviets don't systematically burn their crops, the opposition can't win or be won.

[Question] And the helicopters?

[Answer] Terrifying. There are four types though three of them are vulnerable to heavy machine-gun fire. They fly at 1,000 or 2,000 meters. We saw them bombarding villages, from far away. When you hear them you hide under a rock or under your "patou", a type of earth tone poncho, without which the freedom fighters wouldn't know how to survive. But, the worst of all are the "dogs of war", armored in such a way that automatic weapons are powerless against them.

[Question] However, were you able to move about in the country, circle Kaboul on the South and return to Peshwar without a lot of trouble?

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[Answer] It was necessary to take some precautions. In the mountains, there weren't many problems, except for exhaustion and the excessive heat. Moudjaheddins don't pace themselves as our mountain people do. It doesn't matter how steep the incline. They rush. They stop when they're exhausted. It's unbelievable! Each one of us has lost 10 good kilos during this trip, because we ate like the fighters, with the exception of bread, tea and some candy. In short, where the Soviet patrols circulate, it was necessary to be prudent. We moved mostly by night in forced marches of 14 hours or more.

[Question] And, concerning medicine, what were you able to do?

[Answer] Our mission, as I told you, was to explore. So, we had some material, some anesthetic, antibiotics and antidiarrheic medications. At each stage we examined the sick and the wounded. Specially the sick: tuberculosis, pains in the lumbar area, colic, undernourishment, war fatigue. Because, away from any help, a thorax or abdomen wound is fatal. On the other hand, in an ambush situation it's the mind that takes punishment. So, a lot of sicknesses, benign ones, if you can get to them on time, otherwise they are terminal. The peasants content themselves in enveloping the sick in the skin of a recently slain animal!

[Question] Did you see napalm or gas injuries?

[Answer] Not napalm. But very suspicious eye irritations, which are not conclusive. On the other hand, we have seen a kind of minute camouflaged grenades, which are thrown by helicopters and which children pick up. Many have lost their hands.

[Question] Why did you take so many risks? What made you risk your skin in those mountains?

[Answer] The idea that the MDM mobile clinic will be useful. It takes little to save lives: a liter of Javel water can make liters of disinfectant, it's easy to use, even by improvised nurses. And, besides... to participate, perhaps. To commit oneself.

The doctor has, then, a role of witness, of opinion giver. To take part, even if in the enemy camp, with other wounded, you would be made equal. In the mountains, an old chieftain told us: "After what the French have done here, they can step on the eyes of Afghans. We will still thank them."

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ALGERIA

ALGERIAN GAS SHIPMENTS TO FRANCE RESUMED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Aug 80 p 2019

[Text] On 8 August, the French Gas Company (GDF) issued a bulletin announcing that Algerian gas shipments to France resumed their normal schedule in August. The French Gas Company's major industrial customers have been receiving their normal supply since 6 August.

Algerian gas shipments to France had been seriously hindered since March, apparently as a result of France's refusal to grant a substantial increase in the price paid for gas which the Algerian national firm SONATRACH supplies. The resumption in shipments began with the arrival of nine Algerian methane tankers in July and eleven in August, which corresponds to the seasonal norm. In March, France received only three ships and a single shipment in April.

The latest negotiations on the price of Algerian gas delivered to France took place in July amidst a cordial climate, the GDF emphasizes, but no decision was made. Negotiations are not to resume until the fall.

Nevertheless, a solution must be found before the end of the year, when the Montoir-de-Bretagne methane terminal will go into service near Saint-Nazaire. The terminal will be used exclusively for Algerian shipments in the beginning (5.1 billion cubic meters a year), followed by Belgian shipments (3 billion cubic meters a year). Montoir will be the first terminal in Europe (the capacity of Fos-sur-Mer is 3.5 billion cubic meters a year).

Until March, the price of Algerian gas was on the order of \$3 per million British thermal units (BTU). The rate demanded by SONATRACH would be about \$6. The United States is currently paying Algiers \$4.50 per million BTU.

It will be recalled that in 1979, the sources of France's gas supply were as follows: 39.5 percent from the Netherlands, 12.5 percent from Algeria, 10 percent from the USSR, 8 percent from the North Sea (Norway), and Lacq gas for the remaining 30 percent. By 1985, Algerian gas shipments should make up about 25 percent of French supplies based on long-term contracts signed last year. Nevertheless, France is actively pursuing a policy

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of diversification aimed at substantially increasing its gas shipments from the Soviet Union in particular, but from Norway and the Netherlands as well.

Discussions are reportedly underway with new partners such as Cameroon, Canada, the Trinity Islands and especially Nigeria, with which agreements have already been made for 1984-1985.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

AIRPORT, PORT CONSTRUCTION--As in the area of housing, a joint meeting was held in Algiers on 7 August by Minister of Transport Salah Goudjil and Minister of Public Works Mohamed Kortebi. The meeting was devoted to an examination of infrastructure projects underway or being planned for the near future. The construction and strengthening of airport runways, plans and the construction of new airports were the main subjects taken up. The ministers also discussed port operations included in the Five-Year Plan: repair of piers, development or expansion of ports and construction of the Djendjen port (Jijel). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2019] 11,464

GRAIN HARVEST--The grain harvest in Algeria, running from mid-June to mid-August, promises this year to be much more gratifying than in preceding years. Plentiful rainfall in April and May warrants sanguine predictions of about 24 million quintals as compared with 14 million for 1979. The MARA (Ministry for Agriculture and Agrarian Reform) has been especially careful about providing human and material resources. By 20 July it was estimated that 57 percent of the combining had been accomplished as compared with 44 percent by the same date last year. We still do not have definitive figures. The 20 July figures for 3.2 million hectares that were sown, show that 790,000 hectares have been combined: socialist sector--61 percent; agrarian revolution sector--53 percent; and private sector--55 percent. As analyzed by REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, this positive achievement is due to the efforts of the growers assisted by measures giving them easy access to credit, and to the establishment of mobile teams of technicians from ONAMA (National Farm Equipment Office) as well as "ready-assistance groups" in the decentralized units. But the problems are still not resolved. The most significant problems remaining are: a 25 percent shortage of storage capacity; inadequate numbers of experienced workers; and extremely limited means of transportation. Generally speaking, considerable progress is still required to meet the nation's consumption needs which are in excess of 30 million quintals. This year's fine crop notwithstanding, half of those needs will be met only through costly wheat imports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 29 Aug 80 p 2126]

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IRAN

CLERGYMAN REFUTES CHARGES OF 'EXTRAVAGENCE'

NJO41451 London REUTER in English 1429 GMT 4 Sep 80

[Text] Tehran, Sept 4, REUTER--A clergyman sent around the world by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni to crack down on lavish living in Iran's embassies was today embroiled in a row with the Foreign Ministry over his own alleged extravagance.

"For the past year you have done nothing but stay in the best hotels pouring out unfounded criticism," the ministry said in a statement sharply attacking Hojjat ol-Eslam Huseyni Nuri.

It challenged him to prove "baseless" claims that counterrevolutionaries had not been purged and declared that more than 800 employees at home and abroad had in fact been sacked.

The clergyman has often criticised the ministry for lack of Islamic zeal since Iran's revolutionary leader appointed him last year to speed up Islamicisation of diplomatic missions.

Today he denied the ministry's personal allegation about his hotel bills and said he would answer by publishing the names of diplomats who were counter-revolutionary.

"I have documents about how many first-quality cars, palaces and carpets are owned by each embassy," he said.

The ministry has steadily rejected his criticisms and in its statement, published by newspapers but not by the state media, abusing his status during trips abroad.

He replied in a telephone interview from the provincial city of Mashhad that he had always asked to be booked into the cheapest hotels.

He said he had never taken his family with him, apart from once escorting his son to West Germany at his own expense for medical treatment.

Ayatollah Khomeyni has led the criticism of embassies, declaring in July: "We hear nothing but reports of [words indistinct] food, amusement and prostitution."

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IRAN

'REUTER' REPORTS IRANIAN EXECUTION OF SEVEN BAHAIS FOR SPYING

JN091840 London REUTER in English 1810 GMT 9 Sep 80

[Text] Tehran, 9 Sep (REUTER)--A revolutionary tribunal has confirmed that seven people executed yesterday in the central Iranian city of Yazd for spying were members of the Bahai religious sect, the afternoon newspaper KAYHAN reported today.

KAYHAN published pictures of the seven men who were shot and a statement from the Yazd Revolutionary Tribunal, accusing them of [word indistinct] against the Muslim people of Iran.

The statement said the tribunal tried and sentenced the seven on the basis of documentary evidence, including the national documentation centre.

It said the Yazd Bahai Society was regarded as an espionage centre and added: This nation will no longer allow hired people to serve America and Israel and betray the Koran and Islam.

This is the second time since July that Iranian Islamic courts have admitted to executing members of the Bahai faith, which is considered as heretical by orthodox Muslims. But there has been no confirmation here of foreign reports that 21 leaders of the community in Iran were arrested last month on subversion charges.

The Bahai faith was founded in Persia in 1844, but it is not recognised under Iran's Islamic constitution, unlike the Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian minorities.

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IRAN

BRIEFS

BANI-SADR DENOUNCES FRANCE--Paris, 29 Aug, REUTER--Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-sadr, in an interview published here today, accused France of sheltering terrorists planning to overthrow the Islamic Republic in Iran. He told the daily LE MATIN that France and other Western governments were playing a complex double political game with Iran. "Paris and other capitals say: If you settle the problem of the U.S. Embassy hostages (held since last November), we are quite ready to cooperate. But that does not prevent them in secret from establishing other relationships for tomorrow," the president said. Mr Bani-sadr added: "What I reproach France with is that under the shah's regime we lived in France in opposition deprived of all facilities and continually under pressure, whereas today France has become a training base for terrorists. They are being trained there to destroy our regime." [Text] [JN290949 London REUTER in English 0940 29 Aug 80]

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IRAQ

MINISTERS DISCUSS FOREIGN RELATIONS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4 Jul 80 p 23

[Article: "Iraqi Ministers Latif Nusayyif Jasim and Hamid 'Alwan: Disagreement With Iran Is Intensifying; Iraq Supports Libya; We Want Normal Relations With Syria"]

[Text] In his meeting with the Lebanese journalists who covered the Iraqi general elections, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, the minister of information and culture, has said: Our eyes weep for what is happening in Lebanon. However, the solution continues to be in the hands of the Lebanese and the Arabs and not the hands of the Americans and the Russians.

Regarding detente, the Iraqi minister said that Iraq provided more than one formula for settling the Lebanese issue. However, we are for any solution on which the Lebanese agree under the canopy of the united Lebanon.

Regarding the elections, he has said that the full opportunity has been given to all the citizens, be they candidates or voters, without any discrimination and that the state has taken care of all the expenses of the election campaigns.

Nusayyif Jasim asked all the journalists to convey the facts as they have seen them with their own eyes and as inspired by their consciences, without any censorship. He also told the journalists that all facilities will be made available to them to observe closely the polling operations in any area they want.

When asked about his opinion of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, he said: "There is no steadfastness and no confrontation but there are acts to thwart the masses." He then asked in turn: "How can a successful conference be held in the absence of an advance agenda?"

On the disagreement between Iraq and Iran, the minister said: "It is intensifying and skirmishes are taking place and will continue until a state is established in Iran."

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Hamid 'Alwan, the Iraqi minister of state for foreign affairs, has also answered several questions on the Arab issues of the hour, stressing Iraq's readiness to offer any assistance to the Lebanese, especially in the south, but only through the legitimate Lebanese government.

When asked if there is communication between the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said: "Regrettably, Minister Fu'ad Butrus is very busy and his trips to Damascus are frequent."

On the Iraqi-Palestinian relations, Hamid 'Alwan said: "What is important is that the relationship between Iraq and the PLO be good. We had relations with the Popular Front. Recently, however, this front has had an assessment which we do not consider objective. This, naturally, has a negative impact on our relationship with it."

Regarding the European initiative, the minister has said: "I do not think that it offers a solution. But there is no doubt that it is an advanced step."

On the Iranian threats against the Arabism of the Gulf, the Iraqi minister said: "Any threat affecting any state in the Arab Gulf undermines the Iraqi sovereignty directly. We do not act out of a feeling of custodianship over our brothers in the Gulf. But we do believe that the Gulf security is an indivisible part of Iraq's national security. This is in addition to our pan-Arab [al-qawmiyah] commitments to the area."

On the Egyptian threats against Libya, he said: "Iraq certainly supports Libya because its position toward the Egyptian regime is well-known."

On the Iraqi-Syrian relations, he said: "They are lukewarm. We want to maintain normal relations with Syria. At the level of the pan-Arab relations, our position has not been affected at all by the bilateral relations. I mean particularly by this the commitments toward Syria resulting from the Baghdad summit. Iraq is fully committed and is paying all its dues. The Syrians know this well."

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ISRAEL

PRESS VIEWS, POLICIES ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 12-18 Jul 80 pp 34-36

[Article: "Israeli Press: Its Tongue Is Biting and Its Manner Is as Ugly as Golda Meir's; Taboos: Security, Defense, Occupied Territories and Racism"]

[Text] "Know your enemy" is a wise saying that we have repeatedly cited and continue to cite. But how little do we know about the true character of our enemy! We know it in a distorted and falsified manner as we like to know it and as the official and semi-official Arab information media present it to us.

In dealing with one of the important Israeli sectors, namely the press sector, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has sought to be true with itself, with the reader and with the truth. In doing this, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI acts out of the desire to present Israel's affairs and concerns as they really are, without exaggeration, without ambiguity, without camouflage and without deception. Ignorance of the Israeli details, and even of the generalities, has been one of the main reasons behind the defeat in the confrontation against the enemy. It is time for the Arabs to know more about their enemy before they confront him.

Since the first Zionist congress which was held in Basel, Switzerland, at the end of the 19th century, the Zionist information has devoted enormous efforts to entrench the Zionist thought in the minds of the Jewish immigrants who have come to Palestine from Europe.

The Zionist press has played in the past and is playing at present an important role in this regard, beginning with the first Hebrew-language newspaper issued in Palestine in 1857 under the name of (HALOBNAN), meaning The Lebanon. It is perhaps important to stress that until this day, the Zionist ideology of the national Jewish homeland is embodied deeply in most of the papers currently issued in Israel and representing the various rightist and leftist inclinations, with insignificant marginal exceptions.

It must also be recalled that some of the papers issued in Israel at present are a continuation of the press published under the British administration.

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We cite for example THE JERUSALEM POST which used to be issued by the British administration under the name of THE PALESTINE POST and which is still being issued in English, but under a Zionist management of course.

One of the most important papers founded by the Zionists before the rise of the Israeli entity and still being issued at present is (YEDI'OT AHARONOT) which was founded in 1943, which distributes nearly 100,000 copies daily and which is read by almost 40 percent of the Israeli readership.

Its chief editor is (Chaim Rosenbloom) who is known for his stern Zionist ideas. Yet, the paper is somewhat liberal on the whole. One of the paper's most prominent writers is ('Amos Canaan) who is one of the most important Israeli commentators. He tries to appear objective through his liberal views. He also criticizes the government policy frequently.

Second in importance to YEDI'OT AHARONOT is MAARIV which is an independent rightist paper read by nearly 22 percent of the Israelis. This paper was published after creation of the Israeli entity. Its most prominent writers include Tamir (Golan) who has close connections with the Israeli intelligence (the Sh-B) and Arie Avneri, the writer with the rightist views. This paper is one of the strongest supporters of the present policy of Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

There is also HA'ARETZ, which is the most liberal rightist paper. It always attacks the government policy strongly. However, this doesn't at all mean that it deviates from the Zionist line. It is read daily by nearly 12 percent of the Israeli readership.

Foremost among HA'ARETZ' commentators is (Zaiv Shif), a rightist writer who is always eager to be objective before his readers. He collaborated in writing "The Failure," a book issued after 1973 and constituting one of the main reasons that motivated the Israeli government to form a committee to find out the real causes of the defeat in that war.

This paper's writers also include satirical commentator (Mat Mikha'il), political writer (Uzi Benziman) and 'Atallah Mansur, the paper's Arab correspondent who is from Nazareth and who covers the affairs of the "Israeli" Arabs and the harassment to which they are exposed, but within the framework of the Zionist approach toward the issue of the "minorities" in Israel.

Strong Competition

There is strong competition among the Israeli dailies for the sales market, which is a limited market generally. MA'ARIV, YEDI'OT AHARONOT and HA'ARETZ are issued daily with a number of pages ranging from 28 to 40 pages (size 47x34 centimeters). MA'ARIV and HA'ARETZ also issue a free weekly supplement, consisting of 100-120 pages at times and distributed in Jerusalem only. MA'ARIV [sic] is thinking seriously of entering this competition.

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However, the Israeli press printing is of poor quality generally. Most of the Israeli papers are not printed in the Offset method, unlike most of the dailies of the Arab world. Moreover, the editorship of these papers has not attained any degree of perfection in terms of press craft and art.

The most important weekly magazine published in Israel is HA'OLAM HAZEH, meaning "This World." This magazine was published in the 1950's. In form and in its editorial and technical approach, it is the closest thing to the Egyptian weekly AKHIR SA'AH.

The chief editor of HA'OLAM HAZEH is Uri Avneri, the Zionist writer and politician who is well-known inside and outside Israel. He is currently a member of the Knesset representing the Peace for Israel Movement. He is also the magazine's most prominent editor. He focuses constantly on analyzing and criticizing the Israeli society and policy.

Generally, the magazine supports the peace with Egypt strongly, opposes the construction of settlements and calls for understanding with the Arabs, but within the framework of Zionist premises founded on the basis of the Zionist presence which has been entrenched on the Arab land by force.

According to the Israeli press law, the papers have the full right to publish whatever they want, except for matters pertaining to security and military affairs. Such material must first pass through a special military censorship committee whose members are selected by the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Army Command.

This committee is entitled to omit any report which it deems unsuitable for publication due to violating the state security. For example, MA'ARIV was recently fined 20,000 Israeli pounds for publishing a "security" report that is not in the interest of the state.

The committee has also prohibited the press from discussing the unethical and inhumane violations committed by the Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, especially the acts of (Bento), the Israeli officer who killed a number of Lebanese civilians.

Uri Avneri was compelled to transfer the battle from the press to the Knesset. To complete the theatrical, a semi-superficial investigation was carried out but Gen Rafael Etan, the Chief of Staff, used his right to mitigate the sentence and to release the defendant.

There Is Freedom and Democracy... But

The prevalent saying in the Arab world that there is a false democracy in Israel is actually used to justify the oppression and the tyranny and the abolition of all signs and forms of democracy and of democratic action in this oppressed world.

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Yes, the [Israeli] military establishment has its open and secret influence, and so do the political partisan establishments. But there is a large degree of freedom through which the citizen and the press can move, as long as the movement stays within the limits and dimensions set by Zionism, or the Jewish nationalism.

Perhaps an example of this large degree of freedom is the Israeli press' dealing with the responsibility of the leaders of the military and political establishments in the "failure" to handle the October war. Meanwhile, the Arab press, be it the press of the frontline states or of the supporting states, has failed to tackle, discuss and analyze freely the causes of the big military defeat inflicted on the Arabs in the 1967 war.

Despite the freedom of the press, the Zionist ideology is predominant and all the news, commentary and guidance fall within the framework of this ideology. For example, HA'ARETZ, the liberal rightist paper, refused to publish articles by (Kobi Niev) who usually writes in the paper's weekly supplement, (KOL HAMIR), and this journalist has been forced to publish his articles in the more liberal HA'OLAM HAZEH. What has Kobi said? He has said: "They can kill whoever tells the truth but they cannot kill the truth. There is terror, hatred and fear. But there is the truth also. After the Hebron operation, most of the Knesset member talked about the crime and condemned the operation with a majority vote. But the truth is that there was no crime and that the victims were not innocent..." Kobi means by this the radical Zionists who were killed in the Arab fedayeen operation in the center of Hebron.

Partisan press is well-known in Israel but it is not as strong or as wide-spread as the outwardly independent papers. There is AL HAMISHMAR, published by the (Mapam) Party with its socialist inclinations. This party is presently a member of the opposition (Mi'rakh) Bloc which is led by the (Mapai) Party.

AL HAMISHMAR and Arab Reader

AL HAMISHMAR's most prominent writer is (Amnon Kabliock) who is a member of the party's Central Committee and the correspondent of the French LE MONDE.

However, AL HAMISHMAR's circulation is very limited and is almost restricted to the party members and supporters who are spread in the Kibbutzins.

In the past, the Mapam Party issued AL-MIRSAD magazine under the supervision of an Arab from Nazareth called Ibrahim Shibat. But this magazine's publication was stopped shortly afterwards because the Arabs started turning away from the Mapam Party.

The fact is that the Mapam Party used to enjoy considerable "popularity" among the Arabs in Israel, especially since it adopted some of the Arab demands when it was in the opposition ranks before 1967. This party did succeed in getting them the "right of citizenship" in Israel after 15 years during which their status had vacillated and remained "illegal."

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However, the Mapam lost this "popularity" when the then ruling Mapai Party was able to lure it to the Mi'rakh government coalition after the 1967 war. One of the reasons for Mapam's loss of this popularity is the contradiction between its theory and application. It claims, for example, that it is opposed to settlement in the Arab territories whereas most of its supporters are residents of the settlements, especially the Golan Heights settlements.

(Hamagdal), a religious party, publishes (HATZOFE), meaning The Scout. This party constitutes at present an important bloc in Menachem Begin's government. The paper is distributed among the religious and the fanatic.

There is also ZOT HADEREKH, issued by the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) in Hebrew. This paper is different from AL-ITTIHAD, the other paper which this party publishes in Arabic, in the fact that each of the two papers address the Arabs and the Jews separately and with a different mentality.

There is, furthermore, DAVAR which is issued by the Federation of the Israeli Labor Unions (the Histadrut) which dominates the opposition Mi'rakh Coalition. One of this paper's most prominent journalists is Danny Rubenstein.

Hebrew is not the language of all in Israel due to the variety of the origins, customs and languages of the Israelis. Therefore, seven percent of the Israelis read foreign papers, in addition to the JERUSALEM POST which is published in English and read by two percent of the Israelis. This paper has rightist inclinations and supports the policy of the ruling establishment generally.

There are also a number of papers published in Arabic, the most important of which is AL-ANBA' that is owned by the Histadrut and that supports the opposition in the Knesset (the Mi'rakh). This paper started publication in Jerusalem after the 1967 war. Its chief editor is Ya'qub Khazmi, a Jew of Iraqi origin. One of its most important goals is to influence the Arab public opinion in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to make it more compliant with the Israeli occupation. There is also the communist party's AL-ITTIHAD, the only Arabic-language paper which is non-Zionist.

As for the papers published in the Bank and Gaza, the most important are AL-FAJR and AL-SHA'B, both of which are published in Jerusalem and support the Palestinian national line. After the Hebron operation, the publication of both papers was banned on the orders of Prime Minister Menachem Begin. They were also frequently banned in the past and Yusuf Nasr, chief editor of AL-SHA'B, was deported to Jordan.

To justify the persecution of the freedom of Arab expression in the occupied territories, the director of the Israeli Broadcasting Station has told HA'ARETZ: "The Arabs don't understand the meaning of the freedom of the press and of politics. Therefore, the papers had to be stopped."

AL-QUDS is also published in Jerusalem and follows a suspect political line.

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The Israeli press exercises big influence and has a big impact on the Israeli public opinion by virtue of the fact that it is widespread. It resorts to various sensational means to attract readers, such as interesting reports, flagrant pictures or increased number of pages. In view of the (lack?) of an Israeli public opinion due to the political conditions under which Israel lives, the press tries by way of this influence and impact to suppress the inclinations of "peace" in Israel and to push the public opinion toward positions as close as possible to the current positions of Begin's government.

It is not surprising that the Arab minority, numbering nearly 600,000 people, shows interest in reading the Hebrew-language papers. This is due to the fact that a large number of the members of this minority are in command of or know Hebrew by virtue of studying in schools which teach Hebrew as a basic language. The goal behind this interest is to know and understand the Israeli society in which and under whose captivity they live.

This minority is denied the opportunity to read the Arab papers issued in the Arab world. When Egyptian papers were recently allowed to enter Israel, this minority showed a high demand for these papers because they are the only window through which it can look at its greater homeland.

However, this demand soon diminished and turned after a while into an almost complete boycott for various reasons, including the weak position of the Egyptian press, its disavowal of 'Abd-al-Nasir's legacy, its negative attitude toward the Arab origins of Egypt and this press's position toward the Palestinians, especially when talking about the "profits" or "benefits" that the Palestinians have reaped from their stay in Egypt. This is something that wounds deeply the Palestinian nationalism of the Arab minority in Israel and urges this minority to judge how true is al-Sadat's "Arabism" and "Islamism."

It must be pointed out here that the Egyptian publication that meets fundamental demand among the Palestinian minority is AL-DA'WAH which is published by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This is due to the religious current that is intensifying daily among Israel's Arabs.

But how do the Israeli papers deal with the Palestinian issue?

This press's view of the Palestinian issue embodies the Zionist ideology. This press considers the Palestinian Arabs "enemies who threaten Israel's security" and describes the Palestinian resistance men as "saboteurs" and Yasir 'Arafat as the "leader of a terrorist organization including murderers."

As for this press's view of the Arab world generally, it is a view of disregard and ridicule. Al-Sadat's peace with Israel has not prevented the Israeli papers from ridiculing him. This is evident in MA'ARIV's reports and editorials.

Though the Israeli press tackles with a large degree of freedom, openness and daring the most delicate political and economic issues in Israel, there

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are taboos with which this press cannot deal. This is in addition to the "proscribed security and military matters."

There is, for example, the issue of racism and of dealing with the Arabs in Israel as second or third class "citizens." The taboos also include any deep discussion on the roots of the problem of racial discrimination against the oriental Jews. The rulers, generals and most of the Knesset members and of the journalists are western Jews.

As for news reports concerning the West Bank, they are "security" reports to which the military law applies and which are subjected to the censorship of the military committee. Therefore, it is not surprising that the list of "taboos" banned to the Israeli press includes the cruelty of the military rule to the area's inhabitants and the brutality of the interrogations conducted with Arab detainees.

Insofar as dealing with the conditions of the Arab world is concerned, the Israeli press always likes to compare the "democracy" of Israel with the "tribalism" or the "dictatorship" under which the Arabs writhe. In the view of this press, the Arabs are "backward," regardless of whether this is spelled out clearly or said implicitly.

In any case, even though the Israeli press doesn't come near the Arab world press in terms of circulation or of press printing and technique, it excels over the Arab press by the fact that it enjoys a large degree of freedom in dealing with affairs and concerns that are considered taboo to the Arab press. Anybody touching on such affairs and concerns in the Arab press is exposed to imprisonment, if not pursuit, torture and death.

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LIBYA

COUP ATTEMPT, INTERNAL SITUATION REPORTED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 23 Aug 80 p 32

[Article: "It Will Be Talked About Tomorrow--It Will Be Discussed!"]

[Text] This time it was a red alert. Colonel Qadhdhafi, who owes his power to the army, this time almost succumbed to a military coup d'etat. In spite of Libyan official denials, it seems almost certain that a very serious rebellion had exploded on 6 August last, in the Tobruk garrison. A company of paratroopers had set the movement in motion. Other units were to follow, the objective being to overthrow the man Sadat calls "the mad colonel", and to replace him by a more moderate officer, one less bound to the USSR, which the army does not like perhaps, but which it fears: Idriss Chaibi, chief of special services.

Moreover, for some time now Qadhdhafi had mistrusted his army. There was method in his madness, he set up a personal guard, "anti-coup d'etat", recruited almost totally from his own tribe--the Khedaffeh--and he organized a military security bureau directed by his two cousins, Said and Ahmed. This family system proved to be very effective; Western diplomats stationed in Libya consider that there must have been about 400 military men imprisoned in the past year. In any case he put up a good show this time. Forewarned, the colonel used exceptional aerial and land measures. Finally, Col Abou Bakar Younes' forces, solidly surrounded by East German advisers had, according to the latest news, practically stamped out the Tobruk rebellion. Major Idriss Chaibi was presumed dead--or, according to other sources, had taken refuge in Egypt. But the unrest remained.

The bourgeoisie, small and big, sighs when it thinks of the important transactions which are slipping by. The ulemas in the mosques are beginning to say that Qadhdhafi is easing up on the Koran and getting much too close to the atheist Soviets. The army, which has been increased suddenly from 25,000 to 70,000 men endures more and more resentfully the tutelage of the East German, Cuban and Soviet instructors. Egypt, evidently, blows on the glowing embers. But the fire did not catch this time. How long will Qadhdhafi's luck last?

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LIBYA

LIBYAN DISSIDENT DIPLOMAT CRITICIZES QADHDHAFI

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 22 Aug 80 p 87

[Interview with Mohamed Yusuf al Mougariaf by Roger Holeindre
date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] It isn't a usual thing to find a former president of his country's court of accounts, a man holding ministerial rank, and a former ambassador--these are your titles--going underground to try to destroy the regime he once served. Why?

[Answer] Because we have had too much. The nation has fallen into the most complete chaos. The economic and financial situation is catastrophic. It is hard to make normal people see that in just a few years, Qadhdhafi has brought Libya to bankruptcy, despite its annual revenue of \$20 billion, and despite the fact that the country has only 3 million inhabitants. But that is the reality. Incredibly, in 1980 our country is in debt. Qadhdhafi is even being forced to try to get money from some emirates, places where he is fomenting subversion and which he wants to have eliminated.

[Question] But what about oil?

[Answer] I can assure you, knowing full well what I am speaking of, that over 70 percent of Libya's oil revenues is spent on buying arms and for subversive and terrorist operations throughout the entire world. Financially, the ones who are really profiting from this madness are the Russians. They are paid cash, and as Qadhdhafi doesn't even have a tenth of the men he would need to operate the materiel he buys, the Russians take charge of it. For example, the nation's entire security apparatus is in the hands of the East Germans. Today Libya is a Russian strategic base, and only that, and the Libyan people can not stand this much longer.

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[Question] That is hardly apparent.

[Answer] The anger of the people is rumbling under the surface. On 15 May 1980 Qadhdhafi had the Central Bank conduct a bank-note exchange, but when the people came in with their money, it was confiscated and they were only given back 1,000 dinars per family, which is about 15,000 francs. They were just given a receipt for the balance. Then everyone with such a receipt had to appear before a local revolutionary committee and explain in detail exactly how he had acquired this amount of money. As a sign of protest, we witnessed an incredible sight: people were actually burning their money on the street corners. Moreover, compulsory deductions are taken from salaries to support a fund to be used to finance a possible "jihad" or holy war. But the people know that the huge sums thus being amassed are used mainly to maintain the camps where terrorists from around the entire world are being trained. Today they number about 9,000.

[Question] In your opinion, what does Qadhdhafi want to achieve from all this?

[Answer] What he wants to do is something that the whole world should be worried about: he wants to obtain an atom bomb. This is Qadhdhafi's great dream. In his diseased mind, the bomb is an essential attribute of his power, and he will do anything to get it. His efforts are being made in two directions. The first is through the massive purchase of strategic materials and nuclear reactors, for which he places ads to try to recruit European specialists, offering them vast amounts of money. His second method is the outright purchase of a ready-made bomb from anyone who will sell it to him: governments, multinational companies, or even international gangsters. Right now, in the region located halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi, a huge military complex is coming into being. It is designed for the future atom bomb: bunkers, airfields, underground fuel, munitions, and food storage depots, etc. Everything is being done as if this sanctuary were to become the last stronghold from where Qadhdhafi could threaten the world. People have to realize this: that man is crazy!

[Question] Isn't that a gratuitous accusation?

[Answer] When I say that Qadhdhafi is crazy, I know what I'm talking about. For months he has been obsessed with Sadat. He wants to destroy him, and bring Egypt to its knees by any means he can. One day in the council of ministers he

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proposed to starve Egypt in order to stir up popular unrest. So he suggested that huge sums of money be used to send Libyan agents into Egypt. Their mission would be to buy up everything available in Egypt's food stores! The next day he had come up with an even more radical method: this was, still using the Libyan agents, to buy up all the Egyptian currency. In that way, he thought, Sadat would be ruined. Do you think that's reasonable, and worthy of a chief of state?

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MAURITANIA

NO NEW SPANISH FISHING AGREEMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2025

[Text] The Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed El Moktar Ould Zamed, made an official visit to Spain 4-6 August.

Ould Zamed was received by his Spanish counterpart, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, and met with the Spanish Minister of Transportation and Communication.

Fishing was the main topic of discussion, but a Spanish source has indicated that no concrete conclusions in view of a new agreement between the two countries were reached because of the new Mauritanian fishing policy. The previous agreement between the two countries was denounced last 30 January.

Mauritania will not issue any more fishing licenses for its waters. Instead, Mauritania will encourage the formation of mixed companies using boats flying the Mauritanian flag. However, the realization of this most recent project will indeed be difficult because of the differences between the Spanish and Mauritanian economies.

In addition, two Spanish boats accused of fishing in Mauritanian waters without a license were examined by the Mauritanian coast-guard on 3 August.

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MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

SOLAR PUMP INAUGURATED--A 10 kilowatt solar pump was inaugurated on 24 July in N'Gorel Guidal, in southern Mauritania, on the banks of the Senegal River. Designed by the French Thermal Studies and Solar Energy Company (Sofretec), and financed by the European communities, this pump is only the fourth in the world of its kind. It is a thermo-dynamic pump, storing energy by hot water. The new installation will permit irrigation from the Senegal River at a rate of about 2,000 m³ per day over land which can be harvested 2 or 3 times per year with rice or cereals. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2025] 9572

PAM FOOD AID--The world food program (PAM) has given Mauritania 4,920t of agricultural products in aid for school cafeteria programs. This assistance, with an estimated value of \$4,203,000, will affect about 11,000 students and will be given out over a period of 4 years, from 1980-1984. Mauritania's share will amount to \$7.2 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2025] 9572

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MOROCCO

CROWN PRINCE'S PERSONALITY EXAMINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 5-11 Jul 80 pp 32-33

[Article: "The Crown Prince for Whom They Have Amended Morocco's Constitution"]

[Text] Morocco--Last month, the Moroccans headed for the polls to express their opinion on a constitutional amendment concerning the Moroccan monarchy and the crown prince. The Arab and western press has focused on this referendum without referring to the youth for whose sake it was conducted. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI presents in this article glimpses of the personality of Prince Mohamed, the Moroccan crown prince, and glimpses of the policy and personality of his father King Hassan II of Morocco.

Morocco witnessed last month a referendum to amend some provisions of the constitution to lower the legal age from 18 to 16 and to change the form of the Crown Regency Council.

King Hassan II explained at the time the reasons that motivated him to introduce the amendments, foremost being his wish to give the crown prince an early experience with government and not to leave him prey for the temptations characterizing the 20th century.

The Moroccan crown prince, Prince Sidi Mohamed, will become 17 next August and is the second oldest of the king's 5 children (two boys and three girls).

Sidi Mohamed will continue his education at a private school for princes and the sons of senators, called (al-Mawlawi) Institute. He was supposed to sit for the high school test--the baccalaureate--this year but did not do so, perhaps out of his desire to improve his grasp of certain subjects.

The Moroccan king is eager for his successor to receive a dual education that combines preservation of the Islamic Arab genuineness with keeping up pace with the scientific development of the age.

In addition to the educational, scientific and athletic training, the prince is also trained on experiencing the public issues and on familiarizing himself with the work of the state agencies and of the public utilities so that he may be in touch with all that is occurring around him.

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This is why he started at an early age inaugurating cultural, art and social exhibitions and heading ceremonies for the graduation of cadres, including military cadres. The first official task he performed abroad came at the age of 11 when he attended in November 1974 the mass held at the Notre Dame Church in Paris for the late French President Georges Pompidou. He then deputized for his father in conveying condolences to Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the amir of Kuwait, on the death of Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah. He has also recently attended with a number of European, Japanese and Thai princes the coronation ceremonies for Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.

Traditional Moroccan Apparel

The Moroccan crown prince often appears with his father on official occasions and parties and during speeches dressed in the traditional Moroccan apparel: A flowing robe, a fez and a type of shoe called (al-balghah).

It is not a must that the king's oldest son become the crown prince because the Moroccan constitution stipulates that Morocco's throne and its constitutional rights go by heredity to the king's oldest son unless the king, while still alive, appoints another son as his successor.

For the succession to the throne to be confirmed, it has been customary for the king to get the influential religious, political and educational organizations to express their homage to his son. This homage is considered a commitment of loyalty to whomever the king nominates as his successor.

Since the 'Alawite family assumed power in Morocco in 1640, there has been no conflict over succession, with the exception of the incident which occurred at the time of Sultan Moulai Abdelaziz at the beginning of this century.

Lineage Dating Back to Prophet's Family

The 'Alawite family ruling Morocco has a lineage that dates back to al-Hasan ibn 'Ali Abu-Talib ibn Fatimah al-Zahra', the daughter of the noble Arab prophet. The family came to Morocco from Hejaz at the end of the seventh century of the Hegira or the 13th century A.D. and settled in (Tafilan) in the southern part of the country. This is why the family is also called (al-Filaliyin).

Like the other dynasties which took turn in ruling Morocco, the 'Alawites started their march from their base in (Jalmasah) in their struggle to unite the country and to expel (al-Mu'ammarrin) who had kept on seizing parts of the country, especially on the northwestern coasts.

Their liberation of (al-Ma'murah) and Tangier from the British and their expulsion of the Spanish from (al-'Ara'ish and Asilah) enabled the 'Alawites to become a new force which was able to impose itself on the entire country during the reign of Moulai (Isma'il).

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MOROCCO

KING'S, REGIME'S STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 5-11 Jul 80 pp 33-35

[Article: "Hassan II: Peaceful Coexistence Between Regime and Political Forces"]

[Text] Since the withdrawal of the Arabs from Andalusia, Morocco has played a role that is almost unknown to the Arabs generally in protecting their western borders and their cultural, religious and civilizational heritage from the fierce attacks launched against them. The history of no royal family has been so absolutely entwined with the history of its people as the history of the 'Alawite royal family has been with Morocco's events and long struggle. Like his predecessors, King Hassan II's rule in the past 20 years has been coupled with events and tremors. But through them, the king has been able to establish a firm foundation of rule and a constant formula for dialogue between his regime and the active political forces in the country.

It seems that the political situation in Morocco and the military situation in the Sahara are better than they were a year ago. But what about the future?

Simply, the future depends to a large degree on the ability of Moroccan King Hassan II to continue the policy that he has followed skilfully since he found himself atop the throne one day in 1961 when his father, Mohamed V, died under surgery.

This skill, to which all attest, does not negate the fact that there is criticism in Morocco and outside it of the regime's policy as a whole. There are those who say that the government needs to take fundamental steps to deal with the conditions. However, those supporting and backing the regime say that development is taking place very rapidly and that speeding it up beyond the current pace may result in political and social perils.

The monarchic regime in Morocco is almost unique in the Arab world in terms of its ability to establish dialogue between itself on the one hand and the political and popular forces in the country on the other. Consequently, Morocco can be described as a "conservative liberal monarchy" or a "state with guided democracy."

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Here the king reigns and rules. Next to him, there is a cabinet, an elected parliament and advisers who play roles that grow or diminish in dimension according to the circumstances and to the missions with which they are entrusted.

Despite this strong centralism under which the ruler holds the real powers, there is semi-consensus--in which the opposition both at home and abroad takes part--that the current system is the best formula that guarantees Morocco relative stability under the prevalent circumstances and that the disappearance of this formula may push not only Morocco but the entire area toward the unknown.

Long and Profound Experience

As a ruler, Hassan II plays a major role in establishing confidence in this formula through his long experience with government, management and politics --an experience that makes him fully aware of the delicate internal balances between city and countryside, between Arabs and berbers, between the tribes and between the traditional and modern cultures and cultural currents.

The king doesn't deny that he utilizes all his ability, skill and profound knowledge of his country's situation to serve his regime because this regime is the only means, in his view, for preserving Morocco's historical and national unity.

This distinguished role of the monarchy in Morocco is helped by the duality of the monarchy's religious and secular authority which is derived not only from a long history of struggle to preserve the country's unity and to underline its Arab and Islamic character but also from playing a leadership role in the country's struggle against the invaders coming from the European mainland throughout long centuries.

On the basis of this duality, the king is the prince of the faithful who leads the people in prayer and in war and who guides them in time of peace. This king is also the man who criticized his friend the Shah of Iran because he adopted the one-party system and the secularism that disregards religion. He is also the man who is criticizing religious leader Ayatollah Khomeyni for his excess in "saddling Islam with a burden beyond its capacity."

This adherence to Islam is what imposes on the regime solidarity with the Arabs. This is why the king sent a part of his armed forces to fight in the Golan Heights and on the sands of the Sinai during the October war and why he deserted al-Sadat at the time the latter launched his initiative when the king found that there was Arab consensus against the initiative and when he became certain that the initiative will fall short of realizing the legitimate Arab and Palestinian aspirations for their rights and their lands.

Perhaps the support that Morocco receives from the conservative Arab countries does not emanate only from the fact that Morocco is a kingdom but also from the fact that it is an Islamic country. Thus, Saudi Arabia, with its Islamic

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Arab regime, has resumed its aid to Morocco which is said to be estimated at 1.5 billion dollars which will be paid over a period of 5 years.

Dialogue Between Regime and Political Forces

However, Hassan's skill is reflected clearly in his ability to overcome political polarization and domestic crises. In 1975, the regime announced a program of political openness and of national dialogue coinciding with the start of the Green March to regain the Sahara.

In fact, general elections were held in 1977 and the various major political parties and forces participated in them. Even though the parties and forces supporting the regime won an absolute majority, the socialist opposition also gained a heard voice.

This opposition can express its view through the statements of its leaders, through the parliamentary discussions and through its press. This opposition can express its views on all matters pertaining to the state's general policy in the various spheres. But the law and the constitution prohibit the opposition from launching any attacks against the person of the king himself.

The regime accuses the opposition of excessive demands at times and the opposition accuses the government of committing violations. But all this doesn't prevent the continuation of this dialogue which is taking place in an atmosphere of relative freedom or of "guided democracy" and in freedom from the noticeable political tension in Algeria and the political violence present in Libya or Syria.

The major parties, including the communist party, operate openly and freely and have their offices, papers, organizations, masses, political activities and programs that are not in strong agreement with the regime's programs and goals.

There is also a strong and active unionist movement. For example, nearly 900 strikes were staged in 1978 alone to express the demands of the workers.

There is a press and there are press liberties. The Moroccan opposition press exercises its self-censorship without the authority's intervention. There is also a strong student federation which regained its legitimacy in 1978. Last year, Morocco witnessed a number of student strikes.

There is also an army whose numbers amount, according to western estimates, to 100,000 troops. But the army is an establishment for defending the country, not for ruling or for custodianship over the people and not a state within a state. The Moroccan forces derive their combat and military traditions from a very long-established past. The honor of the Moroccan soldiery was reflected clearly in a rich record of heroism in the battlefields of World War II and in the October battles. These forces shoulder today the burden of defending a desert with an area equal to that of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine combined against forces that have been trained and financed well and supplied with weapons from more than one country and source.

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This policy of openness which the regime adopts toward the political opposition has attained a formula of detente or of peaceful coexistence between the various political support and opposition forces which agree on broad lines that map out the Moroccan supreme interest, such as the issue of the Sahara, and which disagree--without fighting each other--on the other issues.

For example, the opposition supports the regime's policy on the Sahara issue. What is more, some opposition parties are demanding that the regime act more radically in retaliation and deterrence and that it use its right of pursuit in adjacent Algerian territories.

The government coalition is embodied in both the independent and the pro-regime partisan and political forces, including the Independence Party with its historical leadership--('Allal al-Fasi)--of the national struggle against colonialism and for underlining Morocco's Islamic and Arab bonds.

While the regime believes that its popular base extends throughout the Moroccan countryside, with both its Arab and berber areas, and amidst the middle class that has grown and expanded recently, the opposition forces--represented mainly in the Socialist Union of the People's Forces and in the labor and student unions--direct their activities toward the toiling and working classes, the intellectuals and the young generations.

These opposition forces sum up their demands in broadening the regime's democracy, purging the administration, implementing the agrarian reform and nationalizing the fundamental economic utilities.

The regime retorts that the circumstances of struggle to keep the Sahara have strained the economy and that the burden has been intensified by the capitalist west's exportation of inflation to Morocco as a result of the strong link that ties the Moroccan economy to the western economy.

Despite the presence of evident differences in income, the regime is proud that Morocco has not experienced food or essential supply shortages, thanks to the balanced policy that it has followed by laying similar stress on the importance of agriculture as on the importance of industry, in addition to Moroccanizing the industrial and commercial sectors--an act which has broken the foreign monopolization of these two sectors.

Regime and Sahara Issue

The regime also says that it holds a middle-of-the-road position on the political map and that this position enables it to move freely and flexibly.

However, the Sahara continues to be the main issue preoccupying King Hassan. Even though his approach toward this issue throughout the past 5 years has been characterized by skill and composure, no decisive solution to the issue has appeared in the horizon due to the regional and international complications that have developed in the issue because of the intervention of indirect factors and parties not concerned with the conflict together.

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Hassan's strategy in the Sahara issue is founded on the basis of clinging to Morocco's historical right to the Sahara. Though Morocco expresses its willingness to embark upon a direct dialogue with Algeria over the Sahara, and perhaps Morocco is willing to offer its neighbor facilities to reach the Atlantic through a corridor, it is not at all prepared to relinquish its right to sovereignty over its territories and its Sahara.

The king was able to regain the Sahara from Spain without fighting through his Green March. He was then able to gain the support of Mauritania and of a large part of the Sahara population itself. He has also been able to turn the Sahara into a symbol of the country's domestic national unity.

By virtue of his national awareness, the king understands what a sensitive issue the Sahara constitutes to the ordinary Moroccan citizen. This citizen defines the positive positions of states and of international organizations toward him on the basis of their position toward the Sahara. Meanwhile, the Sahara does not constitute such a sensitive or important issue to the ordinary Algerian citizen.

Therefore, even if the king cannot win the Sahara war militarily, he hasn't lost it and will not lose it. Rather, the military situation has improved a lot over last year. Even though the rapid tactical moves of the Polisario have earned the organization small victories, the Moroccan forces are still in firm control of the Sahara towns and oases. Every now and then, these forces send their armored columns and detachments to destroy the secret "stations" that have been set up by the Polisario here and there.

Politically, Morocco views with great pain the "political gains" realized by the Polisario, especially at the African level. Here, the opposition says that greater diplomatic efforts must be exerted to explain the Sahara issue to the Africans and to point out how much of an issue of life or death it is for Morocco while being an issue of bargaining for the other sides.

Hassan II's Personality

Amidst this tension which the Sahara issue has added to the internal political atmosphere and to the regional relations in this vital part of the Arab world, King Hassan II can do nothing but arm himself with patience and courage in dealing with this serious situation.

Some opposition parties censure the regime for its hesitation. But the king is aware that any misplaced move or step may result in serious developments or complications. Caught between this and that, the king has been tackling the issue with wisdom and deliberation that have spared Morocco so far involvement in what is bigger than clashes with the Polisario.

Moreover, the signs of impatience showing on the face of the ordinary Moroccan are not showing on the face of the king who seems to be composed in the numerous press conferences and interviews that he gives to explain his country's position.

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The king doesn't lose his temper in the face of sensitive questions. Often, he gets absorbed in a conversation if his interloper is tactful, intelligent and well informed. Here, the solemn image of the king in his traditional Moroccan costume, which he wears to protocol, religious and national ceremonies, is replaced by the image of the "pragmatic" politician.

The king doesn't get fed up with dialogue and he likes to cite to journalists examples derived from history to convince them of his viewpoint.

As for the speeches which he makes to his people, he delivers them with a strong and calm tone and in correct Arabic, quoting phrases of the venerable Koran.

The Sahara issue continues to be the main preoccupation of the king and of the regime, as we have already said. Even though the opposition forces share this interest with the regime, they are almost in complete agreement that the real future of political stability in Morocco is dependent to a large degree on the ability to tackle the economic crisis, to reduce the class differences and to overcome the daily hardships of the Moroccan citizen.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN FISHING OUTPUT--After 2 years of stagnation, fishing in Tunisia is improving: 57,000 tons in 1979 compared with 55,000 tons, with a fleet of 6,164 boats, including 5,732 coastal vessels. Exports make up some 10 percent of all production: 6,275 tons in 10 months compared with 5,623 tons in 1978. They mainly involve shellfish, mollusks and some fresh fish. The Tunisian Government is encouraging fishing by loans (695,000 dinars) and subsidies (230,000 dinars) and action aimed at extension work, research and professional training. In 1980, a UNDP project will make it possible to prospect in Tunisian waters and evaluate fishing resources by means of a scientific vessel supplied by the FAO. At the same time, a World Bank project will lead to development of coastal fishing. French technical assistance (distribution and marketing) and Japanese aid (new fishing techniques) complete the picture. It is still necessary to restructure an obsolete sector that no longer attracts the young. Results in 1979 show that the General Fishing Commission recently set up has begun to work in that direction.

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